By Tessa Porter
The growing rivalry between global superpowers, the US and China, continues to make strategic geopolitical choices for states in the Indo-Pacific rather difficult. With the announcement of the European Union (EU’s) joint Indo-Pacific strategy in September last year, the trading bloc expresses a clear objective to reposition itself in the region. Whilst many remain sceptical of its capacity to play an active role in a multipolar system, some believe the EU could provide a promising balancing alternative for middle players in the Indo-Pacific. Arguments on either side vary depending on one’s conceptualisation of the international arena and the spheres of influence within.
China’s increasing economic and military influence is raising global concern over the potential socio-economic and political ramifications felt by not only its neighbouring states but by the international community as a whole. The asian country’s expansionist geopolitical strategy has moved into the world’s political spotlight throughout the past decade and most recently became a central part of the EU’s foreign policy objective. States in the Indo-Pacific, are facing particular pressure to strategically balance against, bandwagon with or hedge from either the US and its allies on the one hand, or China on the other. Efforts towards greater economic integration and political cooperation by regional Alliances such as APEC, ASEAN and SPARTECA, are challenged by maritime disputes in the South China Sea and increasing dependency on China’s markets. As the region faces the need for greater investment, economic stability, and infrastructure development, the recent plans by the EU of becoming a more active player seem promising.
As the region faces the need for greater investment, economic stability, and infrastructure development, the recent plans by the EU of becoming a more active player seem promising.
The challenges
However, there is reason for doubt. Internal adhesion and even theories of disintegration within the EU weaken the prospects of the Institution’s enlargement. Questions on whether or not the EU should strive for greater autonomy as a bloc along with the European Commission’s aim to pursue a unified defence strategy are heavily debated amongst its member states. Along with globalisation fatigue and growing polarisation of supranational issues within, experts remain sceptical of the Union’s capacity to expand their sphere of influence.
The recent “stab in the back” by Australia to snub a multibillion dollar submarine deal signed with France in 2016 also signals a lack of European prominence within the region. Australia’s move to favour the new security alliance AUKUS with the US and the UK over what was considered to be a major milestone in French foreign policy, further strained their relationship. Considering the fact that no EU member state is part of AUKUS nor Five Eyes, many are concerned over a growing rift between the western actors, which would complicate efforts towards a multipolar Indo-Pacific.
Along with globalisation fatigue and growing polarisation of supranational issues within, experts remain sceptical of the Union’s capacity to expand their sphere of influence.
Seizing the opportunity
Conversely, some believe that this may actually provide the EU with a better opportunity to pursue its own agenda in the region. Similar to the US, the EU shares a sense of responsibility in maintaining stability within the global arena by upholding the international rules based order. It thus shares an interest in preventing the competition between USA and China from escalating into a conflict. Moreover, it is in both actors’ interests to prevent Chinese hegemony over the international system as, according to US Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, China’s world view is ‘profoundly illiberal’.
However, the White House’s commitments to its partnerships and foreign policy agreements with middle players seeking to balance against China in the Indo-Pacific has come under scrutiny over the past term. Its recent departure from the CPTPP deal for example challenged regional efforts to weaken China’s norm setting power. Following the application of the latter to join the trade negotiations in September last year, the risk of a Chinese monopoly over global supply chains is continuing to shape foreign policy decisions. New Zealand, for example, shifted its strategic stance on the US and its view on their joint security alliance ‘Five Eyes’ last year. Whilst Aotearoa will not neglect any of its partnership commitments, foreign affairs Minister Nanaia Mahuta expressed the nation’s discontent of expanding the scope of the alliance. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern further conveyed their openness to other economic alliances with “ (...) say, Germany, and others”, whilst also reducing its economic reliance on China. This emphasises a clear need for market diversification and alternative investment opportunities for states in the vast region of the Indo-Pacific.
When looking at emerging technologies, sustainable infrastructure, connectivity and innovation, Europe proves to be a valuable alternative to Chinese investments
When looking at emerging technologies, sustainable infrastructure, connectivity and innovation, Europe proves to be a valuable alternative to Chinese investments. In particular with regard to states’ recovery efforts following the impact of the pandemic and a strong incentive to tackle various other threats such as climate change and inequality. For states such as Fiji and Kiribati for example, that are especially vulnerable to coastal erosion and coastal inundation, it is of great significance to gain support of a ‘climate aware’ international power. It is thus at the core of the EUs Indo-Pacific strategy to promote a “...rapid, just and sustainable economic recovery that creates long-term prosperity.”
So, what now?
The balance of power is gradually shifting within the international arena and the Indo-pacific region provides an opportunity for the EU to compete on the world stage. With States looking for ways to strategically position themselves within the current bipolarity dominating trade and intelligence alliances in the region, the EU could challenge that power dynamic.
Internal instability, globalisation fatigue within the EU and a lack of traditional security alliances are amongst the most common reasons for widespread scepticism of such endeavours. However, despite not fitting the traditional security actor mould, the EU still shows great potential in strengthening regional institutions and preestablished ties with its partners in the region. When looking at the economic and political importance of the Indo-Pacific and Europe’s growing stake within, it proves to be critical for both the Indo-Pacific nations as well as the EU to diversify regional trade structures and ensure stability within a more multipolar system.
Whilst these optimistic prospects underline a clear liberal institutionalist outlook on global trends it remains unclear how the EU’s efforts will unfold. How will it gain the trust of smaller nations in the Indo-Pacific without the means of military protection against revisionist actors? Is the EU’s strategy assertive enough? Will it aggregate tensions further? What about other actors rising in the region such as India? Is multipolarity more stable than bipolarity?
Internal instability, globalisation fatigue within the EU and a lack of traditional security alliances are amongst the most common reasons for widespread scepticism of such endeavours. However, despite not fitting the traditional security actor mould, the EU still shows great potential in strengthening regional institutions and preestablished ties with its partners in the region.
Tessa Porter is the Co-President of BridgeAotearoa. She double majored in political science and international relations at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, and was a contributing writer for their student newspaper. She has a strong sense of justice and equality and places a lot of value on communication, sustainability and transparency. Her internship at the Bundestag, in which she dealt with EU-Germany affairs strengthened her understanding of Aotearoa’s and Europe’s political infrastructures even further. With a deep aversion towards echo-chambers, she aims to help create a more open-minded and constructive discussion culture.
BridgeEurope Blog serves as a platform for reflection and discussion on current topics. The opinions expressed in the blog represent the view of the authors solely and not the view of BridgeEurope.